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CoRPORATIONs-DERIVATIVE Su1Ts-WH0 Is A SHAREHOLDER UNDER
FEDERAL RULE 23 (b )-Plaintiff brought suit in a federal district court to
enforce the rights of defendant, an Illinois corporation, to monies allegedly
embezzled by its president and to certain shares of stock allegedly issued to him
illegally. The complaint alleged that plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, "is now
and has been at all times hereinafter complained of the owner of 6538 shares
of tjie common stock of • • • defendant herein." 1 Defendant, showing by
affidavit that plaintiff had never been a shareholder of record, moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to meet the requirements of federal rule 2 3 (b). 2
The court granted the motion, holding that plaintiff's status as shareholder
was governed by the law of the state of incorporation, and Illinois law required
that a shareholder bringing a derivative suit be one of record. 8 On appeal, held,
reversed. The word "shareholder" in rule 23 (b) includes the equitable owner,
who also is permitted to sue under Illinois law. Further, who is a shareholder
under rule 23 (b) is a question to be determined irrespective of local law.4
H.F.G. Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 536.
Early federal cases, in contrast to the majority state rule, apparently required that a shareholder in a derivative suit be one of record. 5 Later decisions,

Principal case at 53 7.
"In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more
shareholders ..• the complaint shall ••• aver (I) that the plaintiff was a shareholder
at the time of the transaction of which he complains. . • ." Rule 23 (b), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938, 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 723c et seq.
3 H.F.G. Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., (D.C. Ill. 1946) 7 F.R.D. 366.
4 Concurring opinion held the question one of substantive law but concurred
since Illinois law was in accord. Principal case at 541.
5 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2263 and note 81 (1938); contra, Citizens'
Sav. & T. Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1910) 182 F. 607, holding stock
certificate merely evidence of ownership and beneficial owner may sue derivatively.
1
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however, clearly established that the right to maintain such a suit was not restricted to the registered shareholder.6 While cases arising under rule 23 (b)
have reached the same result, 7 that result has largely depended upon the effect
given to Erie R. Co. v. T.ompkins,8 which gave rise to the problem whether
_the provisions of rule 23 (b) are to be deemed procedural and hence governed
by federal interpretation, or substantive and hence by applicable state law.9
Decisions upon this point remain conflicting. The problem has not always been
recognized,10 and in many cases where it has, courts have found a decision
upon the point unnecessary because of the conformity of local law.11 Where
state law is in conflict, some courts have vigorously asserted the procedural
character of rule 2 3 (b) ,12 while others in reaching the same result have indicated some doubt.18 Although there is considerable authority upholding the
substantive nature of the rule,14 the recent trend is toward the view that it
6 Arcola Sugar Mills Co. v. Burnham, (C.C.A. 5th, 1933) 67 F. (2d) 981
(pledgee); Starrett Corp. v. Fifth Ave. & Twenty-Ninth St. Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1932)
I F. Supp. 868 (holder of shares still in transferor's name); Willcox v. Harriman
Securities Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1933) 10 F. Supp. 532 (former stockholders induced
by fraud to exchange stock).
7 Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., (D.C. Ky. 1939) 29 F. Supp..658, affd.,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 291 (plaintiffs entitled to 50 per cent of capital
stock, but not shareholders of record); Gallup v. Caldwell, (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 120
F. (2d) 90 (allegations of ownership plus papers submitted to show equitable ownership
c,,f 100 shares); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 422 (double
derivative suit); Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 145 F.
(2d) 293 (residuary legatee); Craftsman Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, (D.C.
N.Y. 1945) 64 F. Supp. 168 (equitable owners under unexecuted stock exchange
agreement); contra, Bankers National Corp. v. ·Barr, (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 7 F.R.D.
305 (stock held through nominee).
8 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938), decided after the promulgation of the·
federal rules but before ,they took effect.
9 For discussion ~f the nature of rule 23 (b) see·IIsen, "Recent Cases and New
Developments in Federal Practice and Procedure," 16 ST. JoHNS L. REV. I at 40
(1941); 38 CoL. L. REv. 1472 at 1480 (1938); 41 CoL. L. REv. 104 at II5
(1941); 9 UNiv. CHI. L. REv. 308 at 312 (1942); 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
2250 et seq. (1938) and id. (1946 Supp.) 87 et seq.
10 Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., (D.C. Ky. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 658.
11 Craftsman Finance & Mortgage Co. v. Brown, (D.<::. N.Y. 1945) 64 F. Supp.
168; Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 293.
12 Piccard v. Sperry Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 1006; Perrott v.
U.S. Banking Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 53 F. Supp. 953.
18 Summers v. Hearst, (D.C. N.Y. 1938) 23 F. Supp. 986; Cohen v. Young,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1941) 4 FED. RULES SERV. 23 b. 1, case 3, p. 412 reversed, (C.C.A.
6th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 721. Both cases relied on the authority of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
14 Gallup v. Caldw~ll, (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 90; Bankers National
Corp. v. Barr, (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 7 F.R.D. 305. Both cases refer to CONFLICT OF
LAWS RESTATEMENT, § 182 (1934): "Whether a person is a shareholder ••. is.
determined by the law of the state of incorporation." See also references cited in note
9, supra.
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is procedural.111 A final decision either way as to rule 23 (b) as a whole
would seem complicated by its different effects upon the provisions of clause
(I). A procedural holding, for example, would result in protecting the interest of an equitable shareholder, but at the same time would deprive a shareholder of a right enjoyed in a majority of state courts to enforce corporate
recovery for transactions occurring prior to acquisition of ownership.18 One
court has reached a compromise solution by holding clause (I) substantive as to
the status of a shareholder but procedural as to time of ownership.17 In the
principal case, inasmuch as the court reversed the holding of the lower court
as to Illinois law, it might have declined to express an opinion as to the procedural nature of rule 23 (b ). The issue, however, was raised below, so the
court took occasion to declare itself in favor of the procedural view.18 In view
of the conflicting decisions in federal courts it would seem a settlement of the
question must await judicial decision by the Supreme Court.19
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28 U.S.C.A., 1947 Spec. Pamphlet, §§ 721-723 at 22.
See states listed 148 A.L.R. 1090 et seq. (1944), also 13 FLETCHER, CoRP0RATI0Ns, §§ 5980, 5981 (1943), id. (1947 Supp.) 31, 32. It should be noted
that N.Y. [22 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1947), § 61] and N.J. [N.J.
Rev. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1945) 14:3,-16] have joined the states following federal rule
23 (b).
17 Bankers National Corporation v. Barr, (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 7 F.R.D. 305.
If rule 23 (b) is finally held substantive, Advisory Committee proposes amending it
to render clause (1) inoperative in jurisdictions where· state law permits subsequent
shareholder to sue. 28 U.S.C.A., 1947 Spec. Pamphlet, §§ 721-723 at 22.
18 Principal case at 539, ,apparently following Perrott v. United States Banking
Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 53 F. Supp. 953 at 956, in supporting the position of Judge
Clark, who argued that in order to maintain the integrity of the federal rules "a strong
presumption should be indulged in that matters included in them as procedural are
to be so held by the courts." "The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules," 1 F.R.D.
,(-17 at 421 (1940).
19 28 U.S.C.A., 1947 Spec. Pamphlet, §§ 721-723 at 22.
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